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The House of Lords in Miller and McFarlane sought to articulate 
principles which would enable the courts to exercise their discretionary 
powers under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973 in a 
consistent manner and provide a fair outcome for divorcing couples. 
The decision was greeted as a tour de force by some media sources, and 
as a gold diggers’ charter by others, for wives who abandoned, or were 
abandoned in, short-lived marriages. It has been variously described as just; 
groundbreaking; historic; principled; a landmark decision; a triumph for 
women; a disaster for wealthy men; and as a trigger for reform of the law 
relating to pre-nuptial agreements. A close analysis of the decision, however, 
suggests that some of these comments may be reflections of wishful hopes 
rather than reasoned responses to the actual reality of the judgment. Although 
it must be acknowledged that the House, on the basis of its construction of 
fairness, did take a significantly new approach to short marriages and to the 
purpose of periodical payments. The law relating to ancillary relief on divorce 
remains remarkably unchanged and problematic.  
 
THE FACTS   
 
(a) Miller  
 
Mr and Mrs Miller were aged 39 and 33 respectively. Prior to divorce, they 
had enjoyed (sic) a short and childless marriage, for a little less than 3 years.  
During that time Mr Miller had taken a lover; left to live with her, and 
eventually married her.  Immediately prior to the Miller’s marriage, Mrs 
Miller resigned from her job in Cambridge and moved to London where Mr 
Miller was working. She took up new employment as an associate partner of a 
public relations firm where she earned £85,000 per annum. Mr Miller was a 
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very successful fund manager and earned £181,000 per annum, plus bonuses 
of £1 million. He had capital assets of £17.5 million. In addition, he owned 
shares, the value of which were difficult to estimate, and in any event, were 
unsaleable at the time of the divorce. However, they were likely to produce 
significant capital sums in the future. Mrs Miller had £100,000 of capital 
assets, half of which was tied up in a pension fund. On divorce, she made an 
application for ancillary relief in the form of a capital sum of £7.2 million, 
which would permit a financial clean break between her and her husband. Mr 
Miller believed that he was generous in offering her £1.3 million, which she 
rejected. 
 
(b) McFarlane 
 
Mr and Mrs McFarlane were both aged 46 and, by contrast with the 
Millers, had been married for 16 years. They had 3 children aged 16, 15 and 9 
years. Mrs McFarlane had been a successful solicitor with Freshfields, but had 
reached an agreement with her husband that she would give up her career to 
be a wife and mother and enable him to pursue a successful career as a partner 
with the accountants Touche Ross. After their separation, the couple agreed to 
divide equally their capital assets of about £3 million, some of which were 
owned jointly and some of which were in Mr McFarlane’s sole name. By 
agreement, Mrs McFarlane was to retain the family home for herself and the 
children, and Mr McFarlane would keep the holiday home in Devon, a flat in 
London, and his partnership current account. The couple also agreed that, 
because there was insufficient capital to allow for a financial clean break 
between them, Mrs McFarlane would be entitled to periodical payments for 
the couple’s joint lives, or until a further order was made, for herself and the 
children. However, they differed over the level of these payments.  Mrs 
McFarlane wanted £345,000 per annum which included £70,000 for the 
children, and £275,000 for herself. In addition, she also wanted school fees for 
the children. Mr McFarlane proposed payments of £60,000 plus school fees 
for the children, and £100,000 plus insurance payments for his wife, for their 
joint lives, or until a further order was made.  
 
(c) The High Court decision in Miller 
  
Singer J accepted that the circumstances in Miller1 patently demanded a 
“clean break” in accordance with the MCA 1973 s 25A. The section, it will be 
recalled, directs the court to consider whether it is possible to end all 
obligations between the spouses, either at the time of the hearing, or at a 
1 [2005] EWHC 528. 
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specified date in the future, and allow them to live independently. After 
considering, albeit in a rather generalised manner, all the factors laid down in 
the MCA 1973 ss 25 (1) and (2), Singer J awarded Mrs Miller £5 million 
which was made up, almost equally, of the family home and capital. She also 
received furniture and other goods worth £150,000. This was certainly a 
significant settlement after such a short marriage.  
Singer J held that neither of the parties’ conduct, under s 25 (2)(g) was 
such that it would be inequitable to ignore it. However, he commented that 
Mrs Miller, unlike her husband, was totally blameless and had neither sought 
to end the marriage nor had she given him any remotely sufficient reason for 
doing so. Singer J believed that fairness demanded that this fact in addition to 
her commitment should be balanced favourably against the brevity of the 
marriage. He maintained that Mr Miller had given his wife:  
 
“ … a reasonable expectation that her life as once again a 
single woman need not revert to what it was before her 
marriage, and that she should be able to live at a significantly 
better standard in terms of accommodation and spendable 
income, even if at one which does not approach the level that 
[he] can afford for himself and his new family.”2
 
Nowhere in the decision is it made clear where “reasonable expectation” 
fits within the MCA 1973 s 25. Whilst it is true that s 25 (1) requires the court 
to take into account all the circumstances of the case, the acceptance of 
reasonable expectation of an enhanced lifestyle as a relevant factor in the 
context of a short marriage to a wealthy husband appears to be an 
extraordinarily generous approach. 
 
(d) The Court of Appeal decision in Miller  
 
Mr Miller considered that £5 million was too generous a settlement for a 
short marriage, and appealed to the Court of Appeal.3 His appeal was 
dismissed; the Court (Thorpe, Latham and Wall LJJ) found Singer J’s 
judgment to be somewhat oblique but nevertheless held that the amount of the 
settlement awarded, albeit at the high end of reasonable, was not excessive.  
Of more particular interest in the decision is Thorpe LJ’s apparent 
confirmation of the reintroduction of conduct as a relevant factor via the 
surreptitious back door route of contribution. He explained that: 
 
2 Para 41. 
3 [2006] 1 FLR 151. 
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“… the language of s 25(2)(g) is intended to discourage 
allegations of conduct unless it is such that it would be 
inequitable to disregard. In other words it is pointless, and in 
terms of costs, risky, to assert misconduct that does not 
measure high on the scale of gravity. But conduct that would 
not merit advancing under s 25(2)(g) is not therefore 
irrelevant or inadmissible. Often the court’s assessment of the 
worth of the comparable contributions will require 
consideration of motives, attitudes, commitments and 
responsibilities.” 4
 
The Court of Appeal also declined to accept Mr Miller’s contention that 
financial settlements after short marriages should merely take into account the 
claimant’s needs. It explained that: 
 
“Section 25 requires a more sophisticated evaluation of the 
extent of the wife’s commitment to and investment in the 
marriage emotionally and psychologically. In some cases it 
may be necessary for the court to assess emotional and 
psychological damage and the extent to which the applicant’s 
future capacity and opportunity to enter into a fulfilling 
family life has been blighted. What a party has given to a 
marriage and what a party has lost on its failure cannot be 
measured by simply counting the days of its duration.”5
 
(e) The District Judge’s decision in McFarlane 
 
Mrs McFarlane was awarded periodical payments of £250,000 a year for 
the couple’s joint lives.6 The award took into account both her needs and her 
right to compensation for her contribution to the marriage and her future 
obligations to the children. By some strange coincidence (sic), this sum was 
equivalent to one-third of Mr McFarlane’s net income (see the now 
discredited rule in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973].7 The district judge accepted that 
Mrs McFarlane could not be expected to work; the age of the children and her 
long absence from her profession as a solicitor limited her capacity to return 
to work in her chosen career.  The couple’s contributions to the marriage were 
viewed as equal, albeit different. Their joint decision to separate their roles 
4 Para 29. 
5 Para 33. 
6 [2003] EWHC 2410. 
7 Fam 72. 
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into income provider and child-carer would continue to have an effect for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
(f) The High Court decision in McFarlane  
 
Mr McFarlane appealed,8 and Bennett J decided that the award of 
periodical payments should only be sufficient to meet Mrs McFarlane’s needs. 
It should not provide her with the potential for capital accumulation to 
compensate her for her past contribution to the marriage and future 
contribution by way of childcare. Bennett J held that she had already been 
provided with a lump sum payment on divorce and he reduced her award to an 
order for periodical payments of £180,000.  
 
(g) The Court of Appeal decision in McFarlane 
 
Mrs McFarlane appealed9 and sought reinstatement of the district judge’s 
order. The Court of Appeal held that periodical payments could be both 
compensatory and needs related. The use of the yardstick of equality in White 
v White10 could be used to check the fairness of the award of periodical 
payments in the same way as for capital awards. The Court restored the 
district judge’s order for periodical payments of £250,000 per annum but 
limited its duration to five years. It held that the order could be reconsidered  
at that point in the light of Mr and Mrs McFarlane’s financial circumstances. 
The Court reasoned that to award periodical payments for the joint lives of the 
couple would be to ignore the clean break principle in the MCA 1973, s 25A. 
 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS DECISION IN MILLER AND 
McFARLANE  
 
(a) The concept of fairness 
 
Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale, who gave the leading judgments in the 
House of Lords,11 both acknowledged the limitations of the MCA 1973 in 
providing guidance to the courts in determining applications for ancillary 
relief. They maintained that the Act had no overarching objective and did 
little, other than to direct them to give primary consideration to the welfare of 
the children of the family (s 25(1)), and to consider the feasibility of ending 
8 [2004] 1 FCR 709. 
9 [2005] Fam 171. 
10 [2001] 1 AC. 
11 [2004] UKHL 24. 
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the financial relationship between the couple by the imposition of a clean 
break (s 25A). The judgments are lengthy, and contain, at least in the 
judgment of Lord Nicholls, a substantial amount of judicial philosophising on 
the nature of fairness. According to Lord Nicholls, the  concept of fairness is 
elusive, it is   
 
“… an instinctive response to a given set of facts. Ultimately 
it is grounded in social and moral values. These values, or 
attitudes, can be stated. But they cannot be justified, or 
refuted, by any objective process of logical reasoning. 
Moreover, they change from one generation to the next. It is 
not surprising therefore that in the present context there can 
be different views on the requirements of fairness in any 
particular case.”12
 
Given this acceptance of the relativist nature of fairness, it is interesting to 
note that Lord Nicholls set that aside and simply imposed his own view of 
fairness in determining principles for the guidance of others.  A close analysis 
of his remarkably unwieldy judgment reveals that he actually does little more 
than impose a hierarchical order on the factors of the MCA 1973, in guiding 
the courts in their exercise of discretion.  He also took an exceptionally 
complex approach to the different categories of property owned by spouses in 
determining what property should be available for reallocation.     
  
(b) The three strands of fairness – Needs 
 
According to Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale, the first strand of fairness 
relates to the couple’s needs. Fairness in the majority of cases, begins and 
ends with needs because the available assets are insufficient to provide for 
anything more.  
 
(c) The three strands of fairness – Compensation 
 
They ruled that if there is any excess income or capital, once needs have 
been met, the courts can then consider the second strand of fairness, that of 
compensation. This redresses the balance when unfair economic disparity has 
resulted from the way the couple conducted their marriage (s 25 (2)), for 
example where a spouse has agreed to give up her career to care for children, 
and support her husband in the pursuit of his career, she will be at an 
economic disadvantage if the marriage breaks down. Even when a divorced 
12 Para 4. 
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spouse is able to earn her own income to satisfy her needs, there may still be 
an entitlement to compensation for the detriment resulting from the earlier 
agreement made with her husband, and from which he has benefited.   
In considering the types of financial awards which might be awarded, 
Lord Nicholls accepted that there was nothing in the MCA 1973 which 
restricted the award of periodical payments for maintenance alone. Such 
payments could equally be used for compensation and to achieve parity 
between the divorcing couple where one spouse has high income and 
insufficient capital to make a final capital settlement. The clean break 
principle, albeit socially desirable, was not to be seen as sufficient reason for 
depriving the claimant of that parity.  
 
(d) The three strands of fairness - Equal sharing 
 
The third strand of fairness, according to the House of Lords, is equal 
sharing. This principle is a development of Lord Nicholl’s judgment in White 
v White.13 It is based on the judicial perception of marriage as a partnership of 
equals who have committed themselves to sharing their lives in an 
interdependent manner. If they divorce, each is entitled to an equal share of 
the partnership assets, unless there is a good reason to the contrary. In White, 
Lord Nicholls stated that domestic contribution and contribution to income 
and capital generation are to be viewed equally unless there is a seriously 
exceptional reason for doing otherwise. Gone are the days of the “stellar” 
contribution argument, usually made by husbands maintaining that their 
contribution to income generation was so special, and made by themselves 
alone, and could not be related in any way to their wives’ contributions. Any 
award must be checked for fairness against the yardstick of equality which 
does not necessarily mean equal division of assets.  
This approach to equality is fraught with similar difficulties to those 
identified above in judicial approaches to fairness; both concepts involve 
relativism and with it inconsistency and uncertainty. At  practical level how is 
to be achieved? What is the starting point for the process? Lord Nicholls 
himself identified the problem. He considered whether in big money cases, 
the parties’ financial needs and the requirements of compensation should be 
met first, and the remaining assets then shared, or whether financial needs and 
compensation should simply be subsumed into the equal division of all the 
assets. Not surprisingly in the light of his flexible approach throughout his 
judgment, he stated that there can be no invariable rule on this; it all depends 
upon the circumstances of the case. Generally, it might be convenient for the 
court to consider first the requirements of compensation and then to give 
13 [2001] 1 AC 596. 
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effect to the sharing entitlement, thus subsuming needs. But this approach 
would not always achieve a fair outcome; in some cases provision for the 
financial needs would have to be assessed first along with compensation and 
the sharing entitlement applied only to the remainder of the assets.  
In the case of short marriages, Lord Nicholls, stated, somewhat obliquely, 
that equal sharing is also applicable because they are nonetheless partnerships. 
However, he attempted to minimise the effect of such a view and proceeded to 
state that the fact that a short marriage has been less enduring will affect the 
value of the relevant assets available for distribution. He elaborated this point 
by a complex explanation of what constitutes the relevant assets which are to 
be equally divided In his view, Lord Nicholls suggested that Lord Nicholls 
maintained that in fairness demands that there should be no distinction 
between what he termed “family” assets, and “business or investment” assets. 
However, he then proceeded to differentiate the assets based on their nature 
and source, and having regard to all the circumstances of the spousal 
relationship. Assets acquired during marriage, other than by inheritance or 
gift, are the financial product of the parties’ common efforts and may be 
referred to as the marital acquest or matrimonial property. Other assets, which 
are not the product of a common effort, may require different treatment, with 
one exception, and that is the couple’s matrimonial home. One of the spouses 
might have purchased the property prior to the marriage, in which 
circumstance Lord Nicholls considered that it should normally be treated as 
matrimonial property because it occupies a central place in the marriage.  
The source of the asset, Lord Nicholls suggested, may be a good reason 
for departing from equality of division. In the case of a short marriage, for 
instance, Lord Nicholls’ instinctive feeling (sic) was that fairness may well 
require that a claimant should not be entitled to a share of the other’s non-
matrimonial property. In the case of a longer marriage the position is not so 
straightforward. Some modest non-matrimonial property may, over time, lose 
its significance and become more like matrimonial property, whilst other 
more valuable non-matrimonial property may retain its individual identity. In 
any event, Lord Nicholls believed that fairness has “a broad horizon” and that 
the courts’ approach must be flexible; that clear and precise boundaries should 
not be drawn between the source of assets. 
 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES IN MILLER 
 
In applying these principles to the facts in Miller, the House of Lords 
dismissed Mr Miller’s appeal. It refused to resurrect conduct, directly or 
indirectly, as a relevant factor except where it was of an extreme nature.  
The House of Lords interpreted Singer J’s view that Mrs Miller had been 
given a legitimate expectation that in future she would be living on a higher 
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economic plane, as merely a statement to the effect that the standard of living 
enjoyed by a couple before the breakdown of their marriage is one of the 
discretionary factors in the MCA 1973 s 25 which may be taken into account 
by the court in determining the amount of the financial settlement. It held that 
if Singer J meant to go further than that, then he had gone too far. The House 
explained that: 
 
“No doubt both parties had high hopes for their future when 
they married. But hopes and expectations, as such, are not an 
appropriate basis on which to assess financial needs. Claims 
for expectation losses do not fit altogether comfortably with 
the notion that each party is free to end the marriage.”14
 
The House of Lords accepted that Mr Miller had brought substantial 
wealth into the marriage at its outset which it regarded as non-matrimonial 
property. He had added, hugely, to that wealth during the marriage and 
provided houses and a very wealthy lifestyle for himself and his wife. The 
award of £5 million to Mrs Miller was therefore viewed as appropriate in 
what was termed “this highly unusual case.”  
 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES IN McFARLANE  
 
Mrs McFarlane appealed to the House of Lords on the basis that the 
award of periodical payments made to her was for a fixed term of 5 years. Her 
appeal was allowed. The House recognised the unusual combination of 
features in McFarlane; the couple’s capital assets were insufficient to allow 
for an immediate clean break but Mr McFarlane had a substantial excess of 
income over his own and his wife’s reasonable needs. His high level of 
earnings was the result of their joint decision for Mrs McFarlane to give up a 
successful and highly paid career to care for her husband and their children. 
Mr McFarlane would continue to reap the benefits of this decision long after 
their divorce because his wife would continue to care for their three children, 
and would remain economically disadvantaged. She would almost certainly 
have difficulties in returning to her career as a successful solicitor once the 
children had left home; her career gap would have been too long.  In these 
circumstances, Mrs McFarlane was entitled to an order which would reflect 
both her needs and compensate her for both her past and ongoing contribution 
to the relationship.  
The House of Lords found that the Court of Appeal’s approach, unlike 
that of the district judge, had concentrated on the view that periodical 
14 Para 58. 
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payments were only permissible for the provision of needs. If capital 
accumulation was possible from periodical payments, the Court of Appeal 
viewed it as an indication that the award would need to be reviewed in the 
future to ensure that it only provide for her needs and was not compensatory.  
The House of Lords did accept that Mr McFarlane might be able to apply 
successfully to a court at a later date for a deferred clean break which would 
allow him to sever his financial relationship with his wife if he could provide 
the appropriate capital to do so. However, that was a decision which Mr 
McFarlane would have to make in the future; it would be inappropriate and 
unjust to impose a time limit on the periodical payments which might not 
have provide sufficient compensation by the time that limit arrived.  
 
COMMENTARY 
 
What has been achieved in the search for fairness by the decision in 
Miller and McFarlane?  
Both Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale have imposed their own view of 
fairness which, as Lord Nicholls admitted, cannot be justified by logical 
reasoning. They have taken the check list of discretionary factors in the MCA 
1973 s 25 (financial resources; financial needs, obligations and 
responsibilities; the standard of living during the marriage; the age of each 
party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; physical or mental 
disability of either party; past or future contributions of either party to the 
welfare of the family; conduct of either party; the value of any benefit which 
either party would lose as a result of the ending of the relationship), extracted 
from the check list needs and compensation and placed these two 
considerations at the top of the hierarchy of relevant factors. To these they 
have added a new principle - equal sharing of assets - dependent on the nature 
and source of the assets, where this is deemed to be judicially appropriate. 
They have given an even greater discretion to the judiciary by minimising or 
even discarding the remaining factors of s 25.  
It is time for a complete overhaul of the law relating to ancillary relief on 
divorce. Too much is expected of the MCA 1973. With or without judicial 
gloss, it is somewhat schizophrenic. The Act both harks back to a time when 
marriage was regarded, at least at its outset, as a long-term commitment, 
whilst at the same time it acknowledges the need for clean breaks and new 
starts. New starts are not financially viable if there are children and there is 
insufficient capital. As to fairness, the Act it never attempted to be fair; such 
an objective is judicially unachievable given the relative, and elusive, nature 
of fairness and because of the very nature of marriage and divorce. The law 
relating to marriage encourages spousal dependency; the law relating to 
divorce aims to make the ex-spouses responsible for their own future either 
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because there is insufficient resources for continued dependency or because 
there are sufficient resources to permit a “clean break”.  
The approach of the House to compensatory periodical payments, whilst it 
is to be welcomed demonstrates the difficulty for couples who fall between 
these two extremes. The MCA 1973 does not permit these payments to 
continue after the payee’s re-marriage; they end automatically on such an 
event. The Act is premised on the view that a divorced spouse who remarries 
becomes dependent on her new partner even though she may continue to 
suffer detriment resulting from a joint decision to further the career of her ex-
spouse at the expense of her own; it denigrates women to a role of 
dependency on men. Any reform of this area of law should consider the 
possibility of achieving a clean-break settlement, where there is insufficient 
capital for a lump sum compensatory payment, by using an actuarial 
evaluation of the payer’s future earnings and dividing the sum into periodical 
payments which would survive the payee’s re-marriage.  
 The decision in Miller and McFarlane is most open to criticism in its 
approach to short-term marriages and indeed has already been heavily 
criticised by lay commentators in this regard.15 The three strands of fairness 
articulated will rarely be appropriate for short-term marriages. Mr Miller’s 
wealth was not engendered, in any way, by Mrs Miller during the marriage; 
she had incurred no detriment which required compensation. There was no 
justification for sharing in this wealth after such a short period of time. 
Furthermore, her needs could be met from her evident ability to earn her 
living from the career she had immediately prior to the marriage. The 
decision, albeit a happy conclusion for Mrs Miller, will make the clamour for 
pre-nuptial agreements by wealthy spouses even louder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 The judgment was delivered on 24 May 2006, and no published academic comment 
was available at the time this case commentary went to press. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
220 
 
 
